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SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM. American Political Thought and Practice. 
By Alpheus Thomas Mason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1955. Pp. 
xi, 232. $2.90. 
The role of political versus judicial restraints upon governmental au-
thority in the United States is the subject of these Messenger Lectures de-
livered at Cornell University by the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence 
in Princeton University. Beginning his analysis with a consideration of the 
political theories influencing the Founding Fathers, Professor Mason dis-
counts Locke's position as the primary so11:rce of American political philos-
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ophy. He admits that Madison and Hamilton, like Locke, felt that re-
straints on government could be imposed by the governed in the exercise of 
their political power, but he points to the important fact that they also 
felt that auxiliary restraints must be provided by checks within the govern-
ment itself. The seeds of judicial review found fertile ground for de-
velopment in such a theory of government. 
In spite of its early formulation as a restraint upon governmental au-
thority, judicial r.eview was little used during the first one hundred years 
of the Republic's history. However, Professor Mason traces the develop-
ment during this same period of two forces, political democracy and eco-
nomic oligarchy, whose eventual conflict revealed its true genius. After an 
initial victory by the surging forces of political democracy, property inter-
ests found their shield in judicial review and their sword in substantive 
due process. For forty-seven years, from Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul 
R.R. v. Minnesota -to NLRB v. ]ones-Laughlin Steel Corporation, the 
Supreme Court provided the judicial brake upon government. 
What caused the demise of restraints imposed by the judiciary on gov-
ernmental action in the economic sphere? Professor Mason minimizes the 
role of political pressures upon the Court. He stresses the recognition and 
adoption by Hughes and Roberts of the Holmes-Stone tradition of judicial 
restraint. That tradition is based upon a recognition, first, that the judge 
is often reflecting his own predilections in his decisions; second, that those 
predilections are unsound which fail to admit the need for governmental 
intervention to preserve individual liberty from economic forces; and third, 
that independent of the soundness of those predilections, the judiciary is 
ill-suited to decide such economic questions. Mason feels that the recogni-
tion of the essential validity of these points, not only by Hughes and 
Roberts but also by the subsequent appointees to the. Court, has led to the 
withering away of judicial restraiµts in this area. 
Professor Mason is not ready to admit, however, that the Court has 
abdicated all power to impose judicial restraints upon governmental author-
ity. He points to two areas in which the Court is still active, i.e., in re-
solving the conflict between federal and state authority and in restraining 
governmental infringements of First Amendment freedoms. While offer-
ing a balanced presentation of the doctrine of "preferred freedoms," Pro-
fessor Mason doubts that judicial restraints can retain much vitality in 
the latter area after their retreat from the economic sphere. 
If judicial restraints are no longer to be relied upon, must resort be had 
exclusively to political restraints? In the economic sphere Professor Mason 
notes the development of the theory of "Welfare Capitalism" -i.e., the 
control by business, and especially big business, of economic activity in 
order to insure general prosperity-as an attempt to place restraints upon 
governmental activity by obviating the need for it. However, he is skep-
tical of business executives' fitness for dealing with the broad social and 
economic problems involved and fearful of the almost complete absence 
of any restraints on their power exercised by the bulk of the citizenry. 
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Professor Mason feels, therefore, that "official, politically responsible gov-
ernment must insist on monopolizing coercive power, as against any and 
all private aspirants for such power." 
In the sphere of First Amendment freedoms he is also clear that it is 
no longer feasible to rely upon judicial restraints-or a constitution or bill 
of rights. Reliance must be placed upon political restraints; "the vitality 
of free government depends primarily upon the people themselves." Pro-
. fessor Mason feels that this vitality will exist only if the people recognize 
that tolerance of all beliefs is essential to the continued development of 
truth and free institutions. 
The difficulty with Professor Mason's approach to First Amendment 
freedoms is that it is based upon two assumptions which are subject to 
some question. He determines that tolerance of all beliefs is essential by 
resorting to the Milton-through-Mill theory that merely by providing an 
open forum for the conflict of ideas we can assume that truth will some-
how prove victorious. However, if truth is to be looked upon as some-
thing more than those opinions which the most powerful in the community 
can force their fellows to accept, then this assumption is as naive as the 
one of Adam Smith that the general economic good will necessarily follow 
from the unrestrained conflict of individual interests. Laissez-faire con-
cepts are as fallacious in the sphere of ideas as in the sphere of economics 
when they permit a well-disciplined minority, employing all the modem, 
organized media of mass communication to hammer the malleable minds 
of the community into a determined pattern of belief. Irrespective of this 
point, however, Professor Mason's approach presents a second difficulty. 
He assumes that the community will recognize the essential rationality of 
his scheme and thereby develop the tolerance necessary to its fruition. This 
assumption would have found ready acceptance in the eighteenth century 
Age of Enlightenment (I might suggest "Enchantment" as a better descrip-
tion) but it is hardly in accord with twentieth century views. Professor 
Mason lays too much stress upon the rational element in man in an age 
in which it becomes increasingly clear that the irrational elements pre-
dominate. 
William R. ]entes, S.Ed. 
